ABSTRACT. We investigate the economic factors that drive electricity risk premia in the European emissions constrained economy. Our analysis is undertaken for monthly baseload electricity futures for delivery in the Nordic, French and British power markets. We find that electricity risk premia are significantly related to the volatility of electricity spot prices, demand and revenues, and the price volatility of the carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) futures traded under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This finding has significant implications for the pricing of electricity futures since it highlights for the first time the role of carbon market uncertainties as a main determinant of the relationship between spot and futures electricity prices in Europe. Our results also suggest that for the electricity markets under scrutiny futures prices are determined rationally by risk-averse economic agents.
INTRODUCTION
A large number of countries worldwide, including many parts of the US, Europe and Australia, have liberalized their wholesale electricity sector over the last 20 years. 1 In such a setting, electricity futures markets serve a variety of key functions and thus their role is central. On the one hand, they facilitate hedging, speculation and arbitrage, increase liquidity and consequently improve price discovery and market efficiency (see, e.g., Sioshansi, 2002; Deng and Oren, 2006) . On the other hand, they allow electricity producers and consumers, such as distributors and retailers, to reach better planning, operation and investment decisions (see, for example, Botterud et al., 2010; Furió and Meneu, 2010) . Indirectly, they also provide useful insights for policy makers (e.g., Borenstein et al., 2002; Bunn and Gianfreda, 2010) .
Our purpose in this paper is to examine the pricing of electricity futures in the European emissions constrained economy. This is still a highly controversial issue despite its importance and the widespread use of futures with underlying physical electricity for more than a decade now. The reason is that electricity cannot be economically stored in large amounts. As a result, the usual cost-of-carry model of Kaldor (1939) , Working (1948) and Telser (1958) for relating spot and futures commodity prices is not applicable in the case of electricity (see, e.g., Pilipović, 1998; Vehviläinen, 2002; Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003; Geman, 2005) .
The usual approach followed in the electricity pricing literature is to derive futures prices on the basis of an empirically consistent continuous-time process of spot prices (e.g., Lucia
and Schwartz, 2002; Bierbrauer et al., 2007; Wilkens and Wimschulte, 2007; Nomikos and Soldatos, 2008) . This method however entails two significant complications: First, electricity spot prices exhibit a highly complex and idiosyncratic behaviour that is characterized by high levels of volatility, strong mean-reversion, periodicities at various time frames and spikes (see, e.g., Knittel and Roberts, 2005; Geman and Roncoroni, 2006) . Therefore, the stochastic differential equation that accurately describes them is also complex and does not lead to 1 For a discussion on electricity market reform trends and policies adopted in different parts of the world see, among others, Mork (2001) , Xu (2004) and Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger (2006) .
closed-form solutions (e.g., Burger et al., 2004) . Second, accurate pricing of electricity futures requires a far from straightforward estimation of the market price of electricity spot price risk (e.g., Pirrong and Jermakyan, 2008; Weron, 2008) .
We avoid these intricacies by concentrating on the determinants of electricity futures prices. Our objective in particular is to study the economic factors that give rise to risk premia in electricity futures prices. In this approach, traced back to the classical hedging-pressure literature (Keynes, 1930; Hicks, 1939 and Cootner, 1960, among others) , commodity futures prices are considered to consist of two parts: the expected spot price of the underlying at the futures contract maturity and a positive risk premium (see, for example, Breeden, 1980; Hazuka, 1984) . This premium reflects the compensation that risk-averse market participants, the hedgers, are willing to pay to less risk-averse investors, the speculators, in order to eliminate their spot price risk (e.g., French, 1986; Fama and French, 1987) . The focus is then to understand the behaviour of the risk premium and most important to uncover its driving factors.
Along this direction, we examine the ability of four economic measures of risk in explaining risk premia in the case of 68 monthly baseload electricity futures for delivery in the Nordic, French and British power market, respectively (i.e. a total of 204 contracts). The period under consideration is from May 2005 to December 2011. The first three risk factors are directly related to electricity market uncertainties. These are the volatility of electricity spot prices, demand and revenues (i.e., the product of spot prices and demand). Their inclusion in our analysis is motivated by the theoretical equilibrium model for electricity dayahead prices of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and the empirical study of Longstaff and Wang (2004) for the day-ahead risk premia in the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) market in the US. The fourth risk factor is the price volatility of the carbon futures traded under the EU ETS (see Daskalakis et al., 2011, inter-alia , for a description of the scheme).
We justify this on the basis of the carbon risk that electricity producers face in the European emissions constrained economy.
This allows us to make contributions in at least three different directions: First, we extend the electricity futures pricing and risk management literature (e.g., Benth et al., 2008; Pirrong and Jermakyan, 2008; Redl et al., 2009; Botterud et al., 2010) . Our results indicate that electricity risk premia for the futures contracts under scrutiny are significantly related to the four risk factors considered. This finding is robust under different specifications for the test regressions and also when the estimations are performed across markets. Moreover, by
analysing the hedging behaviour of electricity producers and consumers along the lines of Benth et al.'s (2008) model we are able to provide an intuitive understanding for the direction of the established relationships. In this manner, we empirically identify the main economic drivers of futures electricity risk premia, explain on a theoretical setting the way in which these factors impact electricity risk premia, and consequently enhance our understanding of the relationship between spot and futures electricity prices in Europe. These insights are of fundamental importance for pricing and hedging relevant derivative instruments under the risk premium approach.
Second, we shed further light on the interrelations between the EU ETS and the European deregulated wholesale electricity markets (e.g., Linares et al., 2006; MansanetBataller et al., 2007; Fezzi and Bunn, 2009; Kirat and Ahamada, 2011) . We find that carbon market uncertainties are a main driver of electricity risk premia in Europe, even after controlling for the potential effect of the price volatility of the primary fuels used for power generation (coal, natural gas and oil). For example, ranking the four risk factors based on the number of statistically significant coefficients obtained reveals that carbon risk is the most important driver of electricity risk premia, followed by electricity spot price risk, electricity revenue risk and electricity demand risk, respectively. Moreover, the inclusion of the carbon risk factor in the test equation increases considerably the explanatory ability of our model.
Most important, we observe a consistent inverse association between electricity risk premia and the carbon risk factor. This implies that power producers provide consumers with a carbon related premium (in the form of a discount in electricity futures prices) for motivating them to buy electricity through the futures market. In turn, this finding highlights a previously unidentified role of electricity futures markets in Europe: they provide a platform for power producers to manage their carbon risk.
Third, we contribute to the literature that studies electricity markets and their operation (e.g., Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002; Anderson and Hu, 2008; Furió and Meneu, 2010; Lucia and Torró, 2011) . Since electricity risk premia respond to economic measures of risk,
we can infer that the prices of Nordic, French and British electricity futures are the result of a rational price generating process.
2
The literature investigating electricity risk premia is extensive (e.g., Shawky et al., 2003; Diko et al., 2006; Kolos and Ronn, 2008; Pietz, 2009) . To the best of our knowledge however, Longstaff and Wang (2004) is the only study that examines the economic factors that give rise to electricity risk premia. 3 These authors provide evidence that risk premia in the PJM day-ahead market are related to electricity spot price, demand and revenue uncertainty.
We differentiate from them in two main respects: First, we concentrate on the risk premia of electricity futures rather than day-ahead prices. This is far from trivial since the day-ahead power market serves a fundamentally different role than the futures one. While the former is used for planning purposes and the optimal organization and operation of the electricity market, the latter serves as a hedging platform for market participants (e.g., Geman, 2005).
Consequently, the economic factors that give rise to risk premia in these two types of market may also differ. Second, we include in our analysis the price volatility of the carbon futures as an additional risk factor that drives electricity risk premia in Europe. Thus, we also examine for the first time the potential impact of EU ETS market uncertainties on futures electricity risk premia and prices.
2 By Nordic, French and British electricity futures we hereafter mean the contracts for delivery in the Nordic, French and British power market, respectively. 3 Other researchers attempt to explain risk premia on the basis of physical and operational (market specific) variables. Examples include: power plant availability, wind power production, gas storage inventories, reservoir levels and hydroelectric capacity (e.g., Douglas and Popova, 2008; Botterud et al., 2010; Furió and Meneu, 2010; Lucia and Torró, 2011; Viehmann, 2011; Huisman and Kilic, 2010) .
ELECTRICITY RISK PREMIA AND ECONOMIC RISK MEASURES
The pricing relationship for an electricity futures contract under the risk premium approach is the following:
In this specification, F t,T is the price at time t of a futures contract written on physical electricity that matures at time T, E t (S T ) is the expectation at time t for the electricity spot price at the futures maturity, and RP t is the risk premium at time t. Substituting the expectation in Equation (1) by the observed spot electricity price at the contract's maturity, and re-arranging, we obtain the relationship of the so-called realized (or ex-post) risk premium (e.g., Weron, 2008):
Our objective is to examine whether the realized risk premium, as estimated by Equation (2), is associated with economic risk factors related to electricity and carbon market uncertainties.
The norm in the asset pricing and commodity pricing literature is to express such measures of risk in terms of second moments. Thus, for the purposes of our analysis we use the volatility of electricity spot prices, demand and revenues, and the price volatility of the carbon futures traded under the EU ETS. Spot price risk, demand risk and revenue risk are commonly investigated as potential drivers for risk premia in the non-storable commodity pricing literature (see Longstaff and Wang, 2004 for a discussion). Moreover, these have been identified as significant drivers for the day-ahead electricity risk premia in both a theoretical and empirical setting (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002 and Longstaff and Wang, 2004, respectively) . Here, we examine for the first time whether this is also the case for the risk premia observed in electricity futures prices. We include the latter in our analysis on the basis of the carbon risk that electricity producers face in the European emissions constrained economy.
To be more specific, since 2005, when the EU ETS became operational, power producers in Europe are subject to an annual cap on the volume of CO 2 they can emit into the atmosphere. This is allotted to them in the form of carbon permits, the so-called European emission allowances (EUAs), with each EUA giving the right to emit one tonne of CO 2 .
Should they wish to emit more, that is, produce more electricity than the amount justified by their emissions cap, they should turn to the EU ETS market in order to buy any lacking permits and avoid the penalties set. In contrast, if they abate emissions and emit less than their cap they can sell the surplus permits and use the proceeds to finance their operation and investments.
Naturally, since the goal of the EU ETS is to reduce aggregate CO 2 emission levels, power producers are short of permits (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008) . As a result, they are exposed to a carbon risk associated with both the volume and price of EUAs that they will need in order to be environmentally compliant (see, e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2009 Alberola et al., 2008) . As a consequence, stricter caps were adopted in Phase II (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) in order to ensure the achievement of the EU emission reduction targets agreed upon in the Kyoto protocol.
Thus, in a rational expectations framework, and assuming risk-averse economic agents, one would expect for this carbon risk to be priced in the electricity futures market. Hence, our 4 We should note that EUA prices represent opportunity costs that, as expected, pass-through to consumers (e.g., Zachmann and Von Hirschhausen, 2008; Kirat and Ahamada, 2011) . However, this carbon cost pass-through cannot fully compensate power producers for the carbon risk they face. The main reason is that even though different generation technologies produce different levels of emissions, the carbon cost pass-through in competitive electricity prices is determined only by the emission intensity of the marginal production plant (see Sijm et al., 2006 for a comprehensive discussion). This means that the carbon cost pass-through is not representative of the actual carbon cost for each electricity producer. In addition, since the cost pass-through rate depends on the elasticity of demand, carbon costs are not always fully passed on to consumers. According to Sijm et al. (2006) for example, the carbon cost pass-through rate in Europe varies between 60% and 100%.
underlying hypothesis that we put to test here is that carbon market uncertainties represent one of the main economic risk factors driving electricity risk premia in Europe. 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION

Data Description
We undertake our analysis for Nordic, French and British electricity futures. This will allow us to study the potential effect of local market conditions on electricity risk premia and their driving factors. et al., 1992) . The results, presented in Table 4 , suggest that at conventional significance levels electricity spot and logarithmic spot prices are stationary.
[ Tables 1-4 about here] Figure 2 plots the aggregated electricity futures price curve for the contracts under study.
Electricity futures prices exhibit similar patterns as spot prices thus implying a close relationship between the spot and the futures market. As can be inferred from Tables 1-3 however, futures prices exhibit on average smaller variation compared to spot prices, fewer extreme observations (lower kurtosis), and, an empirical distribution that is closer to the normal (see, e.g., Lucia and Schwartz, 2002 for similar conclusions).
[ Figure 2 about here] Figure 3 presents the daily electricity load in the Nordic, French and British power markets.
As seen in this figure, demand is consistently higher (lower) during the winter (summer) months as a result of increased (decreased) heating needs. This pattern is also in line with the periodicities observed in spot electricity prices (Figure 1 ).
[ Figure 3 about here]
For the purposes of our analysis we also collect daily carbon futures prices from Bloomberg.
We use futures rather than spot EUA data as it has been shown that the price discovery of the carbon permits takes place in the futures market (Chevallier, 2010 2007 (2011) . Figure 4 presents the evolution of carbon futures prices and logarithmic returns for both phases of the EU ETS. Descriptive statistics are found in Table 5 .
[ Figure 4 about here]
The main observation from Figure [ Table 5 about here]
Realized Risk Premia
We estimate through Equation (2) French and 68 British futures, respectively).
[ Tables 6-8 [ Figure 5 about here]
This seasonality is consistent with the model of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) according to which in periods of expected low power demand and demand uncertainty the forward electricity price is a downward biased predictor of the future spot price, and vice versa.
Moreover, these findings are in line with the model of Benth et al. (2008) for the sign and pattern of electricity risk premia that is based on the temporal dimension in the relative appetite of electricity producers and consumers for risk diversification. To be more specific, these authors argue that electricity consumers are primarily interested in hedging their electricity spot price risk in periods of expected high power demand. In contrast, electricity producers are mainly interested in hedging their electricity revenue risk in periods of expected low power demand for better planning and investment decisions. In the former case, electricity consumers, as hedgers, are willing to pay a premium to power producers in order to motivate them in taking the short futures positions (i.e., act as speculators). In the latter case, electricity producers are the hedgers and hence willing to provide a discount to power consumers in order to motivate them in taking the long futures positions. In this manner, a positive, or relatively higher, risk premium is expected for electricity futures with delivery in periods of expected high power demand and a negative, or relatively smaller, premium when the delivery of electricity concerns a period of expected low power demand (see, also, Pietz, 2009; Botterud et al., 2010) .
Risk Factors
Our objective is to examine whether the realized risk premia for the Nordic, French and British electricity futures under scrutiny are associated with four economic measures of risk:
electricity spot price volatility, electricity demand volatility, electricity revenue volatility and carbon price volatility. Following Longstaff and Wang (2004), we construct these risk factors through a univariate AR(p)-GARCH(1,1) model:
Equation (3) is the conditional mean equation that follows a p-order autoregressive process, with p selected on the basis of the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), and Equation (4) is the conditional variance. Moreover, !~0 , ℎ ! are the residuals from Equation (3), while r t represents daily carbon returns in the case of the carbon risk factor and daily logarithmic prices for the electricity market related risk factors. Finally, h t is the conditional variance for each of the four series.
Constructing the carbon risk factor is straightforward: we fit the above model on carbon returns (with p = 1 on the basis of the SBC); the carbon risk factor is then simply the square root of the conditional variance obtained through Equation (4). In the case of the electricity market related risk factors however, we first need to address a complication. Electricity prices, load, and consequently revenues, exhibit seasonal behaviour (e.g., Knittel and Roberts, 2005) . Thus, we need to deseasonalize each series by regressing it against a time trend, dummy variables for weekly and monthly periodicities and a cosine function for the annual cycle (see Lucia and Schwartz, 2002 and Bierbrauer et al., 2007 for a similar task):
In Equation (5) (3) and (4)) on the relevant deseasonalized series Y ! (with p = 7 on the basis of the SBC).
[ Tables 9-11 about here]
Estimation Results and Discussion
We estimate separately for each electricity futures contract under scrutiny the following regression:
In Equation (6), RP it is the realized premium of contract i on day t; σ S,t , σ L,t , σ R,t and σ C,t is the volatility of the electricity spot price, electricity load, electricity revenues and carbon futures logarithmic returns, respectively; ε it is an i.i.d. error term. We use logarithmic returns of carbon futures since previous research (see Daskalakis et al., 2009 ) has found evidence of a unit root in price levels. Moreover, to allow for a direct comparison across the different coefficients, we standardize all variables prior to estimation by subtracting the mean and dividing with the standard deviation (see, e.g., Hong and Yogo, 2012 for a similar task). In this manner, the parameters express the percentage change in the risk premium for a change of one standard deviation in each risk factor. For example, a coefficient of 0.5 for the electricity spot price risk factor implies that a shock in electricity spot price volatility with a magnitude of one standard deviation will result in a change of 0.5 standard deviations (or 0.5% equivalently) for the realized risk premium. The estimation of all 204 regressions is undertaken using ordinary least squares (OLS) with Newey and West (1987) Second, carbon risk is a highly significant driver of electricity risk premia for the futures under scrutiny. In fact, by ranking the risk factors on the basis of the number of contracts for which a statistically significant coefficient is obtained we find that carbon risk is the most important driver of electricity risk premia, followed by electricity spot price risk, electricity revenue risk and electricity demand risk, respectively. To further assess the importance of the carbon risk factor, we re-estimate Equation (6) for every contract excluding σ C,t from the test regression. This is done in order to compare the in-sample explanatory power as measured by the adjusted coefficient of determination ( ! ) for each contract with and without the carbon 6 In order to further ensure the robustness of our results we re-estimate all regressions using lagged one-period risk factors. The motivation is on the one hand, to check any in-sample predictive ability of the risk factors considered, and on the other hand, to deal with potential endogeneity issues. Moreover, we estimate contract-by-contract pooled OLS regressions, and also a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), in order to investigate whether our results are consistent across markets. In all cases, the obtained results (available upon request) provide a similar qualitative picture as before.
risk factor. As seen in the last column of Tables 9-11 Third, a comparison of our results with those of Longstaff and Wang (2004) for the dayahead risk premia in PJM reveals that the electricity market related risk factors driving electricity risk premia are the same in both the day-ahead and the futures electricity market.
This indicates that although the day-ahead market serves a different role than the futures one electricity prices in both types of market are determined by the same economic fundamentals.
Finally, the results are qualitatively similar in both EU ETS phases and consistent across the different, with respect to market of delivery, electricity futures considered. The former is to be expected since electricity producers were short of EUAs in both phases of the EU ETS.
The latter, however, seems at first glance to be somewhat counterintuitive considering the different characteristics of the power markets where the delivery of the futures under study takes place. For example, the Nordic power market has a considerable share of hydropower in its energy mix, the French of nuclear power and the British of natural gas power. One might argue thus that carbon risk should be a less significant driving factor for electricity risk premia in the case of Nordic and French futures relative to the British contracts. Our results suggest that this is not the case. A plausible explanation can be based on the marginal pricing of competitive electricity prices, the cross-border interconnections and the market coupling 7 We should note that carbon prices are primarily determined by the prices of the main fuels used for power generation, i.e., coal, natural gas and oil (e.g., Aatola et al., 2013) . Thus, it might be the case that our carbon risk factor is simply a proxy for the variation in coal, natural gas and oil prices, respectively.
For examining whether this is indeed the case, we re-estimate all regressions by including the volatility of coal prices, the volatility of natural gas prices and the volatility of oil prices in the test equation Turning our focus to the sign of the statistically significant coefficients, we find that electricity risk premia are in general positively related to electricity spot price volatility; negatively related to the volatility of both carbon prices and electricity revenues; while with respect to electricity demand volatility the signs are mixed. In order to understand these findings we need to consider in detail the hedging behaviour of the main market players along the lines of Benth et al.'s (2008) model.
Consider an electricity consumer that wishes to hedge electricity spot price risk during a period of expected high power demand. This would require entering into a long electricity futures position. As a result, the electricity spot price risk would be transferred to the power producer that holds the corresponding short futures position. Therefore, the electricity producer requires a premium in order to assume this risk. In turn, this implies that the coefficient of the risk factor related to electricity spot price uncertainty should be positive.
This should also be the case for the risk measure associated with electricity demand risk since the delivery of electricity is for a period of expected high power demand. Through the short electricity futures position, however, the power producer secures cash flows and hence removes any revenue uncertainty faced. Moreover, knowing the exact amount of electricity that has to be generated in the future allows the power producer to manage carbon risk. This is achieved by simply buying the number of carbon permits that correspond to the amount of electricity sold through the futures contract immediately upon entering into the short futures position. Consequently, the electricity producer should provide the consumer with a discount for eliminating electricity revenue risk and carbon risk. Hence, the coefficient related to these two risk factors should be negative.
8 Market coupling mechanisms facilitate power market integration by optimizing the allocation of cross-border capacities through auctions. As a result, any price differences between two or more areas are minimized (for more details see EPEX Spot at http://www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling).
With a similar line of reasoning we can explain the signs of the coefficients for the four risk factors under scrutiny in the case when an electricity producer wishes to hedge revenue risk in periods of expected low power demand. This would require entering into a short electricity futures position. As a result the electricity revenue risk would be transferred to the power consumer that holds the corresponding long futures position. Therefore, the electricity consumer requires a discount in order to assume this risk. In turn, this implies that the coefficient of the risk measure related to electricity revenue uncertainty should be negative.
This should also be the case for the risk measure associated with electricity demand risk since the delivery of electricity is for a period of expected low power demand. Through the long electricity futures position, however, the electricity consumer removes any electricity spot price uncertainty faced. Consequently, the electricity consumer should provide the producer with a premium for eliminating electricity spot price risk. Hence, the coefficient for the corresponding risk factor should be positive. Finally, as far as the coefficient of the carbon risk factor is concerned, the arguments presented above also hold in this case and therefore it should again be negative.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We investigate the pricing of electricity futures in the European emissions constrained economy. Our objective is to understand the relationship between spot and futures electricity prices. To this end, we study the economic risk factors that drive risk premia for the case of monthly baseload electricity futures for delivery in the Nordic, French and British power markets. We find that electricity risk premia respond to both electricity and carbon market uncertainties. On the basis of Benth et al.'s (2008) model we are also able to provide an intuitive understanding of the direction of the established relationships. Our analysis is thus of relevance and importance not only for electricity producers and consumers but also for a wide range of other market stakeholders, including, energy traders, speculators and funds.
Moreover, our findings have a clear policy implication. The inverse association observed between electricity risk premia and the carbon risk factor suggests that power producers provide electricity consumers with a discount that is proportional to carbon price volatility as compensation for eliminating their carbon risk. Consequently, increased volatility in the carbon market results in increased hedging costs for power producers. European environmental policy makers should therefore take actions to reduce EU ETS market uncertainties as these have significant but unnecessary cost implications for electricity producers. A way to achieve this is to provide transparent information regarding the emissions reductions achieved to date on a regular (e.g., yearly) basis along with preliminary estimates on the level of the future emissions cap. A natural extension of our work is to study the potential impact of the EU ETS on both the day-ahead electricity risk premia and the optimal hedging decisions in the electricity futures market. 
Note:
The results are presented both with a constant (C) and a trend and constant (TC) in the test equation. * , ** , *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. ADF refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) , PP to the Philips-Peron test (Phillips and Peron, 1988) and KPSS to the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-SchmidtShin test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) . The lag structure in the ADF test is selected automatically on the basis of the SBC. For both PP and KPSS the bandwidth parameter is selected according to the approach suggested by Newey and West (1994). 
where RP it is the realized risk premium of contract i on day t; σ S,t , σ L,t , σ R,t and σ C,t is the conditional volatility of the electricity spot price, load, revenues and carbon futures returns on day t, respectively. The estimations refer to one-by-one regressions of the risk premium for each electricity futures contract on the four risk factors. The last column (Δ ! ) presents the change in the adjusted R-squared coefficient ( ! ) as compared to the case when the regressions are estimated without including the carbon risk factor. For comparison purposes, all variables are standardized prior to estimation by subtracting the mean and dividing with the standard deviation. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard errors are employed for the estimations.
* , ** , *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
